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ABSTRACT 
Maritime Domain Awareness may require reach across Federal, State, local and 
private agency maritime security systems to create an accurate, timely, and reliable 
common operating view.  The view will provide the user with an in-depth, multi layer 
linkage of situational awareness and threat assessment developed from many databases, 
to support different needs at different levels of the national maritime security system. 
Implementing new and emerging technologies into the U.S. Navy system may enhance 
the Maritime Commander’s ability to achieve situational awareness in a more timely, 
efficient, and accurate manner than what occurs now.  Recognizing the advantage of new 
and emerging technologies, the SECNAV and CNO have tasked PEO C4I to develop a 
system, which will aid the U.S. Navy in meeting the MDA mission; this system is known 
as MDA Spiral-1.  This thesis examines the effects of placing new and emerging 
technologies developed in Spiral-1 onto legacy systems and how the U.S. Navy as an 
organization will either absorb these technologies or make multi-dimensional changes to 
enhance the process of achieving MDA. 
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The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) concept was introduced in December 
2004 in the National Security Presidential Directive 41 / Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 13.  This directive established policy, guidelines and implementation actions 
for enhancing U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime 
interests.1  Most importantly the directive established the Maritime Security Policy 
Coordination Committee2 and produced a working definition for MDA, “Maritime 
Domain Awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the 
United States.”3  NSPD 41 also directed the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland 
Security to work together and create a recommended interagency draft for National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, which was signed by the President, September 2005.  The 
strategy is to align all the Federal government maritime security programs into one 
combined plan, and a unity of effort across Federal, State, local and private sector entities 
to achieve the directives set forth earlier by the President in NSPD 41.  This document 
outlines the requirements for eight supporting plans along with a brief description of each 
plan.  The eight plans developed in support of the strategy deal with specific threats and 
challenges of the maritime environment.  Each plan is separate; however they are 
grounded in the security principles stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security.  
These plans are: National Plan to Achieve Domain Awareness, Global Maritime 
Intelligence Integration Plan, Interim Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, 
International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, Maritime Infrastructure Recovery 
Plan, Maritime Transportation System Security Plan and Maritime Commerce Security 
Plan, and Domestic Outreach Plan.4 
                                                 
1 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-
13 (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, December 2004), 1. 
2 Ibid. 3.  
3 Ibid. 5. 
4 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.:  Department of Homeland Security, 
September 2005), 27. 
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The MDA requirements set forth in the National Strategy for Maritime Security 
can be found in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.  This plan 
labels MDA as “the critical enabler that allows leaders at all levels to make effective 
decisions and act early against a vast array of threats to the security of the United States, 
its interests, allies, and friends.”5  For this to happen the plan calls for and will rely on a 
national maritime common operational view.  This common view can be accessed by 
users at the Federal, State, and local maritime agency level with the goal of providing 
each user with the “right” amount of information to aid them in their pursuit of MDA.  
The National Strategy further states the need to harness emerging technologies and strap 
them seamlessly onto current legacy systems.  Taking the concept a step further is the 
Fleet MDA Concept of Operations, implemented by Fleet Forces Command, 13 March 
2007.  It presents the U.S. fleet with a “how to”, by defining standardized MDA-related 
processes and mechanisms while giving direction for the development of a Navy 
architecture to support MDA.  While its main thrust is operational, it also deals with 
tactical as well as strategic issues. 
Combined, the above-mentioned documents give a basis for how the U.S. Navy 
may reorient itself to take advantage of emerging technologies and efficiently deal with 
the latest threats to the maritime community. Using this perspective the question for this 
thesis is; As a system what affect will the MDA concept coupled with the adoption of 
Spiral-1 technologies have across the U.S. Navy?  By adopting MDA into its current 
mission, the U.S. Navy must first decide how best to define Awareness in the Maritime 
Domain.  The problem of “awareness” must be defined and scoped to what is possible 
and what can be known within the context of how the U.S. Navy operates.  After a 
common understanding and scoping of awareness as it pertains to the mission of MDA is 
made, how the U.S. Navy will adopt that understanding will be discussed.  Additions to a 
system, whether technical, or non technical, generally implies that change is required 
elsewhere within that system and across multiple dimensions of that system.  Change 
may be necessary, for example, across organizational dimensions such as  organizational, 
                                                 
5 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland 
Security, October, 2005), 20. 
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technological, cultural, paradigms, operational, and processes (work).  While a study 
across the many dimensions would be helpful in understanding the range of change 
required, this thesis will specifically study the implications for change that may occur 
within the dimension of information processing, or the core work for system and 
organizations within the system.  Specific data collected from a process engineering 
workshop will be used to demonstrate and align specific Spiral-1 technologies with 
specific MDA tasking.  The results of that data will then be used to explain the changes 
that may occur and be needed in changing the processes used by the Navy to turn data 
into information and move that information to the appropriate user in the most efficient 
manner. 
By adopting the MDA mission the U.S. Navy recognizes a need to make changes 
to the current Navy mission.  Changes to the mission start with a common understanding 
of the new mission.  Understanding MDA involves understanding “awareness” and how 
it is applied throughout the Navy system along with how it is implied in the guiding 
documents for MDA.  Changes for the U.S. Navy to achieve MDA will undoubtedly need 
to take place.  Any time change is initiated in a system multiple changes can occur.  
Changes to technology can trigger changes in the process.  Changes in processes may 
lead to further changes in outputs from the system.  Along with changes to the outputs the 
workers who use the process may change themselves.  Studying change and the 
dimensions of change will lend insight to how MDA Spiral 1 technologies will affect the 
U.S. Navy system.  Data will be presented from a study conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School establishing how technological change can affect processes already 
in place within the Navy system.  The results of this study will be used to show how 
multi-dimensional change does not necessarily promote fundamental change across 
multiple systems.  For multi-dimensional change to affect multiple dimensions changes 
across the systems using the processes must be purposefully implemented 
While this thesis will address changes inside the U.S. Navy system, the same 
analysis can be made across the multiple systems, which are key stakeholders of 
Maritime Security. In order to maintain a secure maritime environment, the cooperation 
of Federal, State, local, and private agencies will be needed.  It is important to develop a 
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layered in-depth approach to defending U.S. and ally maritime interests, but that 
development will occur on many levels and across many entities, which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  Also, this thesis will not argue for or against implementing MDA, as 
this decision is a mandate.  The current administration has made it clear, the MDA policy 
will be implemented and specific technologies have been tapped to make this possible. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) combines Situational Awareness and Threat 
Awareness (TA) to create working knowledge maritime commanders can use to better 
utilize resources, while allowing the tactical operator access to the same information.6  
Allowing the tactical operator access to the same information in the same format the 
maritime commander uses is vital to allowing the most efficient decision making to occur 
at the lowest level.  Key to this understanding is the role of information.  Thanks to 
advances made in how data is moved, stored, and accessed; the operator has the potential 
to retrieve and view the same data used by analysts who turn the data into information 
and add to the operator’s awareness.  This ability could eventually make the analyst 
obsolete or change how the analyst provides information to the operator or even how the 
operator gets their information.  Full MDA achievement is difficult, requiring 
cooperation over many levels, agencies, and countries.  The Information Age has created 
a culture in which the expectation for information can be fulfilled at almost real time.  
The use of routable networks allows for strategic commanders to see the same 
information available on the tactical operator’s system.  Technologies that allow the 
strategic commander to see the tactical operator’s SA also allows the tactical commander 
to view the TA available to the strategic commander.  Broadening the information shared 
across commands rather than up and down small information highways may cause an 
information overload and indecision, crippling the on scene commander rather than 
serving as another weapon upon which the commander can use to help thwart the enemy.  
This thesis will asses the abilities of technologies being presented in the MDA Spiral 1 
project to increase SA, combine it with threat awareness to create a workable MDA 
                                                 
6 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington D. C.:  OPNAV 00, May 2007), 4. 
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environment maritime commanders can use more effectively to assign resources more 
efficiently and thwart those threats.  The argument for or against MDA is not in question, 
that work has been done before, and it was found that MDA is something the maritime 
community needs to make it safer.  This thesis argues for the best implementation of 
technology to allow the maritime commander to succeed in achieving MDA, which will 
ultimately allow for more efficient and better decision making of the limited resources 
available. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Many argue the U.S. Navy has been doing Maritime Domain Awareness or some 
form of it since its inception.  It is possible to believe this statement.  After all weren’t the 
original commerce raiders of the American Revolution required to find and overtake 
enemy British vessels?  And not to mention the blockade-runners of the Civil War, who 
clearly needed some form of intelligence to aid in the support of the rebels.  Both 
required a unique set of information to aid in their pursuit or evasion of the enemy.  
Scheduled arrivals and departures of vessels, helped create situational awareness, while 
number and relative position of British Man of War vessels aided in the threat assessment 
needed to overcome the seemingly insurmountable odds of the revolutionary sailor.  
Throughout history many examples can be found of MDA aiding the maritime 
commander in making the decisions necessary to overcome an enemy.  The common 
thread throughout the examples is having the most accurate and up to date knowledge of 
what or who is the enemy, finding that enemy and swiftly prosecuting them with the most 
efficient means available.  Today the challenge remains the same, find the enemy, and 
bring the appropriate force to bear with the most efficient use of the resources available.  
The scope of the problem has changed.  No longer does the enemy take the form of a 
recognizable nation state with forces common to the U.S.  Terrorists, piracy, and human 
trafficking are among the list of threats to international maritime commerce and the 
sovereign territory of the U.S.  Along with recognizing the broadening scope of the 
enemy, the U.S. has realized the need for reducing such threats as far from U.S. shores as 
possible.  By blending the traditional role of extending U.S. policy around the world, with 
the role of law enforcement, U.S. Navy must take strides in sharing multiple layers of 
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information across its own system as well with organizations outside the U.S. Navy.  This 
shift in mission and sharing information will also ignite a change to traditional U.S. Navy 
maritime efforts to include a Maritime Domain Awareness perspective. 
1. NSPD 41 / HSPD 137 
The Bush administration recognized the need for a document, which could bring 
together the many Federal, State and local agencies to work together in achieving 
maritime security.  National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD – 41) / Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD – 13) was signed by the president December 
2004 and is the guiding directive to implement policy, authority and responsibility for a 
more secure maritime environment.  It begins with a call for combined efforts at the state, 
federal, and agency level to oppose any threat to the US and partner maritime assets.  It 
also required the creation and development of different programs to include: the founding 
of the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee, the development of a National 
Strategy for Maritime Security; charging the Senior Steering Group for MDA to create a 
national plan for MDA, calling for the integration of Global Maritime Intelligence, 
coordinating International efforts and international outreach; developing a national 
Maritime Response Plan; developing a national maritime infrastructure recovery plan; 
produce recommendations for improvements to the national and international maritime 
transportation security system; and the development of a maritime supply chain security 
plan.  The committee is an inter-agency body serving to coordinate all U.S. Government 
maritime security policies.  It will review these policies along with inter-agency 
coordination and execution as it relates to maritime security and give any 





                                                 
7 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-
13 (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, December 2004). 
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2. National Strategy for Maritime Security8 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security was signed September 2005.  Inside 
this document the requirements for MDA can be found.  It begins with the reasons for 
establishing a more secure maritime environment: 
In today’s economy, the oceans have increased importance, allowing all 
countries to participate in the global marketplace.  More than 80 percent of 
the world’s trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link.  
About half the world’s trade by value, and 90 percent of the general cargo, 
are transported in containers.  Shipping is the heart of the global economy, 
but it is vulnerable to attack in two key areas.  Spread across Asia, North 
America, and Europe are 30 megaports/cities that constitute the world’s 
primary, interdependent trading web.  Through a handful of international 
straits and canals pass 75 percent of the world’s maritime trade and half its 
daily oil consumption.  International commerce is at risk in the major 
trading hubs as well as at a handful of strategic chokepoints.9 
With the U.S. and global economy tied so closely to the world’s oceans, a national 
strategy was needed to fulfill the Presidential directive and better establish a secure 
maritime environment. 
 The threats to the maritime security environment are spelled out and described.  
The threats listed range from the common nation state threat, to criminal and piracy 
organizations.  And now include the not so common threat of environmental damage, 
illegal immigration and terrorist threat.  Each threat is unique but they all still impact the 
maritime security environment, whether it’s in a traditional use of sea power to capture 
and deny the usage of international water ways or the not so obvious threat of a massive 
storm wreaking havoc upon a coastal shipping town.  No longer can the U.S. only be 
concerned with projecting power overseas and on the seas, it must look to how 
controlling sea lanes can benefit the security of the U.S. by other means.  It’s not enough 
to stop other nation states or piracy groups from threatening U.S. and allied merchant 
shipping.  The illegal smuggling of migrants and terrorists is a relatively new and 
strategy, which must be addressed in order to keep the homeland, secure.  And by 
                                                 
8 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.:  Department of Homeland Security, 
September 2005). 
9 Ibid. 1-2. 
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including in this strategy the means for dealing with natural disasters that may occur in 
and around a port city the strategy rounds out a comprehensive plan calling for many 
agencies to work together. 
 After naming these threats, the strategy goes on to name three guiding principles 
to address these threats:  
First, preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority. Second, 
the United States Government must facilitate and defend commerce to 
ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping. Third, the United States 
Government must facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people 
across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.10 
While these are the guiding principles upon which this strategy will be developed 
the United States does not ignore its inherent right to self defense and defend itself 
against all enemies.  While using these guiding principles four explicit objectives are 
named: Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts; Protect Maritime-Related 
Population Centers and Critical Infrastructures; Minimize Damage and Expedite 
Recovery; Safeguard the Ocean and Its Resources11  Again each one is unique and poses 
it’s own challenges.  The strategy makes a case for each objective and what specifically is 
to be dealt with in each objective, while at the same time recognizing these objectives are 
part of an overarching strategy to secure the maritime environment against any threat.  By 
enacting the aforementioned strategic objectives the original five objectives of the 
strategy can be met.12  The focus of this thesis will be on the objective of Maximizing 
Domain Awareness. 
It is from this section of the strategy that we get our working definition of 
Maritime Domain Awareness.  Naturally any domain is a large area and may encompass 
all parts of the environment that can be recorded, processed and/or manipulated.  Our 
strategy concerns itself specifically with having awareness and threat knowledge of the 
                                                 
10 The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.:  Department of Homeland 
Security, September 2005), 11. 
11 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, October 2005), 8. 
12 The objectives are: Enhance International Cooperation, Maximize Domain Awareness, Embed 
Security into Commercial Practices, Deploy Layered Security, Assure Continuity of the Marine 
Transportation System. 
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relevant domain to achieve maritime security and prevent adverse events.  The maritime 
domain is a large area; the oceans are vast areas that cannot come under complete full 
time surveillance with the limited resources available to the U.S.  Couple that with 
intricacies found in any port city, the non-transparent ownership of vessels and cargoes, 
the high rate of turnover and poor record keeping of crew manifests and the result is a 
maritime security environment which is very difficult to monitor, detect within it 
significant anomalous behavior, and even harder--to prosecute under international or 
national law once a case against suspects can be made and the suspects found.  Overall it 
could be a case of being too late when prosecuting a suspect vessel of having WMD 
before it reaches the U.S. shores.  It could also be a problem of tracking and hand off 
from agency to agency or even from fleet to fleet for the purpose of pursuing a possible 
terrorist suspect before that suspect disappears in the miasma of the port city and country 
in which we may not be familiar.  Or the suspect could possibly be lost until he is found 
after causing a catastrophic event on U.S. soil.  The strategy speaks to these dilemmas 
and addresses them with calling for more information sharing and a new coordinated 
cooperation among various elements of the public and private sector.  The strategy turns 
the problem into an information-sharing problem.  By having various agencies and 
elements of the private sector work together both nationally and internationally a synergy 
can be developed to engage the enemy and prevent them from carrying out any plans to 
cripple the U.S. and it’s allies by means of the maritime environment. 
3. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness13 
This document lists the goals, and objectives of MDA along with what types of 
organizations will be needed and how those organizations will need to process 
information to work together and achieve MDA.  This document looks to fulfill needs put 
forth in the National Strategy for Maritime Security.  The needs presented in the National 
Strategy call for the enactment of this plan in achieving Maritime Domain Awareness.  
This plan stems to meet the strategic goals of: 
                                                 
13 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, October 2005). 
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• Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter and defeat 
threats as early and distant from U.S. interests as possible; 
• Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the 
full spectrum of maritime threats; and 
• Sustain the full application of the law to ensure freedom of navigation and 
the efficient flow of commerce.14 
The plan ties these strategic goals into objectives that directly relate to the MDA mission.  
Creating systems that gather data alone will not meet the needs of achieving a persistent 
and accurate system able to detect and alert users to maritime security issues.  These 
objectives are listed in an essential MDA task list: 
• Persistently monitor in the global maritime domain: 
o Vessels and craft 
o Cargo 
o Vessel crews and passengers 
o All indentified areas of interest 
• Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure 
• Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision makers to 
facilitate effective understanding 
• Access, develop and maintain data on MDA-related mission 
performance.15 
The combination of stated strategic goals with a clear essential MDA task lists makes for 
a plan organizations can use to develop their own concept of MDA.  The organizations 
the plan looks to for implementing MDA come from Government Organizations, 
International Organizations and Private Sector Organizations.  The plan recognizes the 
unique capabilities each organization brings to the maritime domain and realizes MDA is 
not achievable without the direct support and cooperation of these organizations.  
Enabling actions for MDA are listed with an emphasis on information management.  Key 
to making MDA achievable when working across multiple security agencies at home and 
allies abroad is: Enhanced Information Collection, Information Sharing, and Establishing 
Set Standards from which all can reference and adhere.  And the technologies that make 
                                                 
14 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, October 2005), 7. 
15 Ibid. 8. 
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these key acts possible are: Improved Sensors and Platforms, Communications that 
disseminate knowledge in a common operating picture, and technologies that exploit the 
information gathered, automating processes that assist the analyst in a rapid 
understanding of the data gathered. 
 The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness addresses a particular 
technique for building a more secure Maritime Environment.  This plan along with the 
other eight named in the National Strategy for Maritime Security, address a complex and 
changing environment which the U.S. must operate and depends upon for its economic 
livelihood.  Implementing this plan and the changes commiserate with achieving the 
objectives listed depends upon developing paradigms which reflect the urgent need for 
improved maritime security.  Adding to current paradigms will take time and can be 
achievable, but understanding the plan and being open to change is essential to achieving 
MDA. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
U.S. awareness of the maritime domain is a product of Federal, State, local and 
private maritime security organizations and systems.  As directed by the President of the 
United States these systems will coordinate and cooperate at varying levels to achieve a 
comprehensive plan to enhancing maritime security.  The U.S. Navy has chosen to 
implement a set of technologies labeled MDA Spiral-1 as its part in enabling the Navy to 
add in the achievement of MDA.  Adding or taking away from a system will have an 
effect on the system being changed.  This thesis looks at the impact of implementing 
Spiral-1 technologies onto the U.S. Navy. 
Research has been done in the area of situation awareness.  A qualitative research 
into awareness attempts to build a framework for understanding the term “awareness” 
and how it is applied in the maritime domain.  A model created by Endsley will be used 
to demonstrate how individual situation awareness is developed.16  Referencing Nofi’s 
discussion on shared situation awareness furthers how an organization and the individuals 
                                                 
16 M.R. Endsley, “Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems”, Human Factors 31 
(1) (1995). 
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within the organization build awareness.17  Both are applied to how watch standers, 
decision makers and the organizations they operate within can hope to build their 
awareness. 
Implementing MDA involves “change” and to understand how fundamental the 
change may be, an understanding of “change” must occur.  This thesis describes concepts 
of change as presented from the perspective of large-scale organizational change.  A 
qualitative description of the processes for change, the aspects of change, and how to 
recognize and process change is made. 
Data is then presented reflecting the current state of MDA in the U.S. Navy.  The 
data is taken from a qualitative study directed by OPNAV N3/5 and conducted by NPS.  
It presents Spiral-1 technologies, workflow diagrams for current MDA processes, and a 
table for matching technologies to MDA tasks.  A qualitative analysis of the data follows 
highlighting common threads across varying levels of the U.S. Navy and the socio-
technological affects of implementing technological change. 
The presented perspective of awareness as it applies to individuals, and 
organizations in building MDA along with understanding the affects of change in large-
scale organizations is used to reach conclusions on the implementation of MDA as a 
concept and technique within the National Strategy for Maritime Security.  The 
conclusions specifically address the affects of implementing Spiral-1 technologies onto 
current U.S. Navy processes.  The conclusions are based on a system analysis approach 
using a business process redesign (BPR) technique. 
                                                 
17 Albert A. Nofi, Defining and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness (Alexandria, VA:  Center 
for Naval Analyses, 2000). 
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II.  AWARENESS 
A key tenet of Maritime Domain Awareness is understanding the term Awareness 
and how it is meant in the context of the Maritime Domain.  The Navy’s Maritime 
Domain Awareness Concept signed by then CNO, ADM Mullen gives a U.S. Navy 
perspective on MDA, “consists of what is observable and known (Situation Awareness), 
as well as what is anticipated or suspected (Threat Awareness).”18  This statement covers 
much of the maritime world.  It locks us into Awareness of anything dealing with the 
Maritime Domain to include, ports, rivers, oceans, tributaries, straights, the vessels which 
float on them, the associations the crews who man those vessels have, the ports 
frequented by those vessels and routes taken to get to and from those ports, the 
association of the owners of those vessels, the cargo itself where it came from where it is 
going, who owns the cargo and who is moving it, the information systems used to track 
all this for each individual business, the means by which the many entities involved in the 
vessel or port go about communicating.  Many more elements from the maritime domain 
could be added to create an exhaustive list that may never fully encompass the entire 
maritime domain.  Which is exactly how the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness frames MDA, “Maritime Domain Awareness is the effective understanding of 
anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, 
economy, or environment of the Unites States.”19  It is from this posture the U.S. Navy 
can only hope to define MDA within the scope and boundaries of what is possible for the 
individual decision makers and as an organization and system acting within the National 
Maritime Strategy.  A model was developed by Endsley to help explain and better 
understand Situational Awareness.  This model will also be helpful in understanding the 
U.S. Navy’s MDA concept and is presented as Figure 1. 
                                                 
18 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington D. C.:  Chief of Naval Operations, May 
2007), 4. 
19 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, October, 2005), 1. 
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A. INDIVIDUAL SITUATION AWARENESS 
 
Figure 1.   Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision-making.20 
 
The model presents SA in the individual cognitive domain with three distinct 
levels of SA.  These levels are: “Level 1 SA: Perception of the Elements in the 
Environment; Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the Current Situation; Level 3 SA: 
Projection of Future Status”.21  Level 1 is the raw data or information gathered within a 
particular environment.  In the maritime domain it can be many elements to include 
vessel name, course and speed, local or regional weather to name a few.  This process 
occurs anytime one ship is within sight or radar range of another and any information 
about that particular vessel is gathered.  The next level is relating that information into a 
context that is useful or meaningful to the user.  The decision maker takes level 1 
                                                 
20 M.R. Endsley, “Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems”, Human Factors 31 
(1) (1995): 4. 
21 Ibid. 5-7. 
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elements and puts them together to create a meaningful picture of the situation in relation 
to goals and expectations. An individual watch-stander’s experience and knowledge is 
critical to forming level 2 SA.  It is not enough for the user to look at the data collected 
without a frame of reference.  To know the name, location, course and speed of a vessel 
doesn’t mean much unless the individual can relate those elements back into a goal or 
why that information may be important.  Perhaps the watch stander is looking for a vessel 
around the same location with the same course and speed.  By comprehending the 
location, course, and speed with a desired goal of finding a match the watch-stander 
begins to build their SA.  And the final level of SA (projection) becomes the most useful 
to the decision maker.  At this level the watch-stander is using the comprehension (level 2 
SA) of the environment (level 1 SA) to predict possible outcomes and subsequent actions 
to deal with the current environment.  Relating this to the maritime domain, a watch-
stander may notice a report or see a radar or satellite image of three small ships.  By 
combining the elements of information regarding each ship the watch-stander 
comprehends these ships may be on a course to meet on the open seas and projects the 
time and place of their meeting. 
Endsley’s model can be applied directly to the mission of achieving MDA.  The 
technologies involved in Spiral-1 allow the watch stander to gather elements of 
information to build level 1 SA.  As the information is gathered and entered into a 
program, databases are queried and connections are made, level 2 SA is achieved.  The 
watch-stander then projects the actions of the particular ships being reported by using 
their own level 2 SA.  In addition, the watch stander then uses their level 2 SA in relation 
to their forces to produce an assessment, which allows the decision maker to assign 
resources to further investigate the anomaly or dismiss it.  Through this process the 
individual has certain experiences and knowledge that add to their ability to achieve the 
different levels of SA.  This may include the individual’s technical prowess in regards to 
the program being used to gather information.  Also the individual’s amount of 
knowledge regarding the environment will determine how often level 1 SA information is 
addressed or looked for in adding to level 2 SA.  If the watch-stander is unfamiliar with a 
particular region or particular shipping company, much more level 1 knowledge will have 
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to be gathered by the watch stander to build comprehension and further project where that 
particular ship may be going or what type of cargo it may have.  The experiences of the 
individual and the limitations of the technologies used all contribute to the individual’s 
SA.  That individual may be a decision maker, or a watch stander tasked with keeping the 
most up to date operating picture.  In both cases the individual is building their own 
individual cognizant picture.  The assessments made by those watch standers are still 
individual situation assessments that may be used across the organization to aid in 
building an overall awareness.  MDA spiral-1 technologies do just that, they enable the 
user to create their own situation assessment through different applications, queries inside 
those applications and the databases that are accessed.  Keeping the intent of MDA in 
focus, these assessments must be transferable and usable for other decision makers to 
develop and create their own situation assessment. 
B.  ORGANIZATIONAL SITUATION AWARENESS 
Each Situation Awareness level of Endsley’s model depends on the lower level, 
however the linear progression from level 1 to level 2 and level 3 is not necessary.  
Endsley describes when this process is not beneficial, “The reality, however, is that a 
simple 1-2-3 progression (i.e., data-driven) is not an efficient processing mechanism in a 
complex and dynamic system, which is where expertise and goal driven processing come 
into play.”22  The U.S. Navy as an organization is in direct conflict with this statement.  
As an organization it lacks the ability to create a cognitive picture.  What ever picture is 
being created that picture comes from the efforts of many individuals within the system.  
The systems being used by the individuals in creating their own maritime awareness 
pictures need to be a shared system.  By making it a shared system the Navy ties the 
problem directly into a data-driven problem.  Replacing and updating the systems in 
place that help build an individual’s awareness is an ongoing endeavor.  By using the 
most current and cutting edge technology in information sharing can the U.S. Navy as an 
organization hope to build an organizational awareness?  The Navy Maritime Domain 
                                                 
22 M.R Endsley, “Situation Awareness: Progress and Directions,” in A Cognitive Approach to situation 
awareness: theory and application, ed. Simon Banbury, and Sebastien Tremblay, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Pub., 2000), 317. 
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Awareness Concept gives a description of how it views MDA, turning it into a data-
driven problem reliant on Global Maritime Situation Awareness (GMSA): 
A precondition to true MDA, and to successful execution of many of 
Navy’s worldwide mission sets, is establishment of robust GMSA: a 
multi-layered, multi-domain picture that links the identity, location, 
known patterns and present activity of ships, cargo, people, and hazards 
within and adjacent to the maritime domain.  This picture derives from the 
pooling of a comprehensive set of mostly unclassified data contributed by 
the many agencies and nations with knowledge of the maritime domain.  It 
is a compilation of information, regardless of classification, ranging from 
environmental data (oceanographic, meteorological, etc.) to vessel 
positions and characteristics, to cargo manifests and supply-chain 
information, to biometric identification data, to regional activity patterns 
(fishing areas, commercial routes, seasonal variations, etc.).23 
At best the U.S. Navy can hope to achieve shared situation awareness.  Working 
across an organization an individual can build their own relational situation awareness of 
any given region or time.  When that individual assessment gets passed onto another user 
perhaps in the same region, on the same watch, or across the organization to a user 
outside the context of that watch the assessment is no longer contained in the individual’s 
cognitive “picture” of awareness.  The assessment that is passed along is a snapshot of 
that individual’s awareness, and the individual continues to create his or her own personal 
awareness by updating or asking for more level 1 SA.  The organization and users within 
the organization must rely on the assessment made by each individual in the system to 
create their own situation awareness and subsequent assessment.  Albert Nofi explains 
the dilemma in his study, “In any given ‘situation’ these people each have their own 
‘individual SA,’ a unique dynamic picture of the situation, which exists in their minds.”24  
Nofi also gives 3 distinct actions performed by the individuals to build shared situation 
awareness: 
 
                                                 
23 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington D. C.:  Chief of Naval Operations, May 
2007), 9. 
24 Albert A. Nofi, Defning and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness (Alexandria, VA:  Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2000), 26. 
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• Build individual situational awareness within the framework of the 
mission to be accomplished 
• Share their individual situational awareness, which requires being “aware” 
of relevant actions and functions of other team members. 
• Develop the group “shared situational awareness.”25 
The emphasis placed on the individual input to the organization cannot be ignored.  For 
the individual to give a meaningful and useful input he or she must have a clear 
understanding of how their part contributes to the overall MDA mission.  As the 
individual builds their levels of SA and makes queries back to the level 1 elements they 
must do so with the overall mission in mind otherwise they build an assessment which is 
of no use to the decision maker.  As an organization that operates in a shared situational 
awareness environment the U.S. Navy must identify its own organizational impediments 
to building shared awareness across the organization and outside the organization. 
Communications, both technical and as social network, is critical to building 
shared awareness.  Not only must there be a common means (i.e., interoperable 
communications systems) through which data must flow, an agreement to how that data 
is viewed or read must also be standardized.  For the most part the U.S. Navy 
communications systems work well.  Communication plans establish the frequencies 
used within and across the organizations.  Well-established circuit discipline dictates the 
use and manner for which an individual communicates across the system.  And the use of 
Internet protocols within applications communicated over a routable network, users can 
view the same information at or near real time as the user who is creating that view.  
MDA Spiral-1 technologies look to do just that, allow a user to create a view from 
multiple sources that can then be used as an assessment in building awareness the 
decision maker can use in assessing the possible threat, and then prosecute the threat or 
allow the vessel of interest to pass.  The U.S. Navy concept for awareness names three 
primary elements, which must be met to achieve MDA: 
 
                                                 
25 Albert A. Nofi, Defning and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness (Alexandria, VA:  Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2000), 26. 
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• Global network or regionally based maritime information exchange 
partnerships. 
• Institution of worldwide standards for broadcast of vessel position and 
identification. 
• Automated tools that discern patterns, changes, and potential threats.”26 
Clearly the view presented from these requirements presents MDA as a data-driven problem 
involving not only the U.S. Navy but also maritime partners around the world.  The 
information shared across the U.S. Navy and with maritime partners creates a shared 
situational awareness built on individual assessments. 
Once the common ground to communicating individual SA across the organization is 
established, truly shared situational awareness can happen.  Within that shared awareness a 
question of accuracy arises.  As individuals bring their own awareness to the combined 
awareness, the amount of overlap between individual awareness is finite.  As established 
earlier each individual will bring their own unique SA to the group.  The combined group SA 
will share only a portion of each individual SA.  There is no way of knowing exactly what 
another person may know.  None of us can read another person’s thoughts, and our 
experiences help create what we know about any given situation.  Nofi illustrates this with a 
diagram: 
 
Figure 2.   Diagram of Shared Situational Awareness.27 
                                                 
26 Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington D. C.:  Chief of Naval Operations, May 
2007), 7-8. 
27 Albert A. Nofi, Defning and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness (Alexandria, VA:  Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2000), 33. 
 20
Each letter can represent an individual within a group or each letter can represent a group 
within a system.  Either way, when the knowledge contained within each is combined 
with others, the result is an awareness that is unique and smaller when compared to the 
original awareness.  This illustration also demonstrates how accurate information in the 
original awareness elements is critical to the user in making the best, most well informed 
decision possible.  The decision maker is making decisions based on the information 
passed along, and if that information is inaccurate the decision maker’s conclusions about 
the situation and best pursuit of a course of action may also be inaccurate.  To say 
accurate SA will enable the decision maker to make the best decision is not completely 
correct.  Decision makers can only hope to get the most timely and accurate information 
enabling them to use their best judgment in making decisions.  But how can that decision 
maker be sure the content he or she is viewing is the most accurate and timely 
information available?  Nofi sites a model suggested by Barry McGuinnes, 
 
Figure 3.   Measuring SA28 
 
                                                 
28 Albert A. Nofi, Defning and Measuring Shared Situational Awareness (Alexandria, VA:  Center for 
Naval Analyses, 2000), 41. 
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In McGuinness’s model the objective is the actual information, or elements used to help 
build SA.  The subjective measure is a relative number used by the user to describe their 
belief in their own SA.  Of course the decision maker and individual want to reside in the 
upper left of the diagram.  They want to know everything they can about the given 
environment and through their comprehension understand every facet and connection of 
the information present.  This diagram does not give an empirical measurement of SA, it 
still relies on an individual assessment.  It can become very dangerous when the 
individual resides in the upper right quadrant.  Here the individual does not know all the 
information available, but believes they have a firm understanding of the situation.  The 
assessment given by that individual may be lacking some vital piece of information, 
which would lead the individual to view the situation differently.  Being in the lower left 
quadrant may show the individual lacks confidence in their assessment or does not have 
enough experience to comprehend the information and place it into a useable assessment.  
Being in the lower right quadrant the individual may recognize their inability to make an 
accurate assessment because of missing information.  This individual may then begin to 
seek out that information to raise their comprehension and better assess the situation.  In 
all cases the individual is making an assessment of their own SA.  In no way is an outside 
source used to evaluate their SA.  While this technique has limitations, it may be the best 
tool available to aid the decision maker in accepting or rejecting another SA in building 
their own SA. 
 Overall, awareness is subjective and dynamic.  It exists inside within an 
individual’s cognition.  The individual’s experiences and technologies used to build their 
SA all have an effect on their SA.  Individuals bring with them elements of experience 
which can add to their subjective understanding of the world and cognitive view.  The 
technologies they use can help build on their cognition or distract and not add value to 
their experience.  How familiar an individual is with a technology can determine how 
much of an aid or hindrance the technology will be in adding to the individual’s 
cognition.  While an organization cannot posses a cognitive, working picture, it can 
enable sharing between individual SA to help build a common view, or understanding, 
across the organization.  When building a shared situational understanding, systems must 
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be designed which build upon a common language (or taxonomy), understand and 
incorporate dynamics of cognition through which individuals build SA and include the 
ability to assess inputs from all relevant nodes allowing the decision maker to use their 
experience when assessing the information given to build the most accurate and timely 
view.  As technology continues to develop and allow for better sharing across an 
organization, techniques and training must be part of the development to ensure a 
common view with discrete understanding of the system used is developed and useful.  
Allowing organizations to share data will not create awareness in the maritime domain.  
However, giving those organizations a template from which they can input data and use 
shared information to create a common view will aid in the organizations awareness of 
the maritime domain. 
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III. CHANGE 
To understand an organization it is fairly common to look at it as a system of 
inputs, processes and output with some kind of feedback to the input process.  Figure 4 
from The Congruence Model:  A Roadmap for Understanding Organization Performance 
published by the consulting firm of Mercer Delta gives a very simple and basic graphical 
depiction of an open system.29  Any system can be understood by using this model as a 
basis.  The system will have some kind of input from which it will manipulate or change 
that input via the different processes it has adopted and goals or missions it is attempting 
to perform, and produce some kind of output that is useable by the system, organization 
or another system outside its own organization. 
 
Figure 4.   Basic Systems Model30 
 
Changes to any part of the system can (and generally will) result in changes to the 
organization and other parts of the system. 
 The model used and presented here is a basic systems model.  It represents how 
systems take inputs; puts them through a process which changes them to outputs of the 
system.  In an information system the inputs can be raw data, numbers or figures.  The 
data is then put into a system or application for example an application like Excel.  A 
                                                 
29 “A Congruence Model:  A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational Performance,” (Mercer 
Delta Consulting LLC, 1998), 3. 
30 Ibid. 3. 
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series or parallel set of actions take place changing the raw data into an output the system 
deemed usable.  The outputs can then lead to further changes in what inputs the system 
may need to create useful outputs for the system.  Or the feedback can help refine the 
transformation processes creating again more useful outputs for the system.  The 
transformation process can be made from other systems creating multiple levels of 
system processes.  But each level can be viewed from this basic system analysis 
approach. 
The President in NSPD41/HSPD13 directed changes to the National Strategy to 
include Maritime Awareness.  The mandated change put forth by the President developed 
a National Strategy for Maritime Security along with subsequent plans to support the 
strategy.  The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is one such plan 
used by the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations to direct change in the 
U.S. Navy.  The CNO viewed MDA as an information problem, to be solved with new 
emerging technologies.  The OPNAV office then tasked PEO C4I with identifying 
technologies to be added to the U.S. Navy systems.  These technologies are now known 
as Spiral-1 technologies, as the first increment of MDA capability.  Their purpose is to 
change the way the U.S. Navy interacts with the requirement for MDA, and its inclusion 
as a system that extends USN participation through the rest of the MDA system. This 
chapter will further investigate the different aspects of change in a large-scale 
organization.  To include which aspects of change have the most impact on 
fundamentally changing a large-scale organization.  And highlight which aspects of 
change the U.S. Navy is implementing to enact a change consistent with the direction of 
the President through the Secretary of the Navy and CNO? 
Change in any organization must happen for that organization to survive.  
Anytime a new technology, policy, or process is leveraged onto an organization that 
organization will experience change across different dimensions.  These changes will 
affect in different ways and amounts many aspects of the organization.  An organization’s 
culture, the way the organization is structured, the operational processes of the workers, 
the operating environment of the organization, what old technologies will be replaced, 
and which new technologies will be adopted are a few examples of the elements affected 
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by change.  While all of the above mentioned areas would be affected by any change in 
the organization, they may not change to the same degree.  Depending on the type of 
change, how it is implemented and the “to be” will determine how much overall change 
will need to occur to adapt to the changes made.  The cumulative amount of change 
adopted by an organization may force that organization into making a fundamental shift 
or paradigm change.  It is also possible for an organization to adopt one aspect of change 
that is so fundamental the organization must also make a fundamental shift. 
A. LARGE-SCALE CHANGE 
Large-scale change is one form of change associated with organizations.  Change 
in any organization can take on many forms.  Organizations change constantly to meet 
the continuous evolving dimensions it operates.  Most changes occur when the 
environment changes.  Inputs into the system may change because of resource 
constraints; changes in technology may affect the process and how the workers use the 
system, new management may take over and decide to change the output or goal of the 
organization.  Determining if large-scale change is needed or has occurred is a function 
of how far reaching (depth), how pervasive and at what level (just upper management or 
through the entire organization, i.e., size) change is implemented.  An agreed upon 
definition for large-scale change is, “As a starting point, we will define large-scale 
organizational change as a lasting change in the character of an organization that 
significantly alters its performance.”31  It is fairly common for organizations to make 
small changes affecting many departments and believe it is making large-scale changes 
affecting the whole organization.  Moving personnel within a department, adding new 
technologies to ease or accommodate workflow or shifting responsibilities of departments 
are not large-scale changes.  While many people may be affected by these changes, their 
behavior within the system does not need to change or the behavior of the system doesn’t 
need to change to adopt the structural changes placed on the system or the organization.  
The system simply absorbs the changes and keeps the same processes with the same 
inputs and produces the same output.  New technologies that allow the workers to process 
                                                 
31 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 2. 
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an input may require some training but the input stays the same with the same output.  
The process changed but the system remains intact.  Shuffling personnel to different 
departments is the same as shifting responsibilities of departments.  The inputs, 
processes, and outputs remain the same with different people doing the work, again not a 
large-scale change.  Neither the character nor the performance of the organization 
changed in a lasting way to call this large-scale change. 
1. Organizational Character 
One of the elements necessary for large-scale change must occur inside the 
organizational character of the organization.  The character of an organization is made up 
of the key aspects to the open system: inputs, processes, and outputs.  The character of an 
organization will be affected with changes across the whole system, not just one of the 
key aspects.  Environmental changes can affect the inputs of a system.  For a data driven 
system like MDA it may be how the system acquires inputs.  Is the input raw data, or 
information from processed data on another system?  For MDA an emphasis has been 
placed on receiving the raw data from never before used databases outside the U.S. Navy.  
The change to inputs has been the ability to access the same databases different agencies 
access instead of relying on the reporting system in place to transfer information.  The 
process itself within the system is another aspect of change.  Once the inputs are received 
how does the system change or manipulate the data into a useable format for that 
particular organization.  It can be argued the U.S. Navy already has systems in place to 
do such things.  And from this description the process has not changed rather it is being 
“enhanced”.  Already, we see one aspect of how implementing MDA will be a change in 
the character of the U.S. Navy.  This statement also points out how the adoption of 
Spiral-1 technologies will make a change in the coordination, integration and 
dissemination of information across the U.S. Navy system.  The U.S. Navy will have to 
coordinate with systems outside their own organization and disseminate information out 
to other organizations.  The change here is in communications and ultimately affects the 
inputs to the systems being used.  Again the actual processing of the data will not change.  
The technologies will only enhance the processes in place.  The outputs of this system 
will remain the same, although the output product will be enhanced through the 
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enhancement of the processes, which produce the product.  No significant change in the 
process or product is leading to a large-scale fundamental change in the U.S. Navy 
system. 
2. Organizational Performance 
If an organization changes its processes it will then in turn change the outputs or 
uses different inputs.  When all aspects of the system are changed the organization may 
be experiencing a fundamental change.  When the character of the organization changes, 
so too may the performance of that organization.  When this happens truly a fundamental 
change to the organization is occurring.  Not only will the organization’s character 
change, but that change will have an effect on how the organization itself performs, 
“Performance is a broad term that can refer to the system’s effectiveness as measured on 
a number of dimensions or to the nature of the dimensions themselves.”32  Organizations 
can go from being regional to encompassing a more global influence.  No longer will it 
be measured on the standards of the region it is operating but in the global environment it 
has chosen to participate.  As the organization becomes more dependent on other 
organizations how it relates to the needs of the other organizations may change.  
Communications outside the organization, how it perceives itself compared to others 
perception of it may change.  If other organizations find it hard to work with the 
processes in place the performance of that organization may need to change to 
accommodate the other organizations now that it is dependent on them.  What were 
priorities inside the system may change due to greater influences from outside the system.  
“Thus we would expect large-scale organizational change to alter both the nature of the 
organization’s performance and its effectiveness as measured on a number of 
performance dimensions.”33  The MDA concept calls for greater cooperation across 
Federal, State and private agencies.  Having agencies work together in ways they haven’t 
in the past will stimulate those organizations to change how they perform different tasks.  
                                                 
32 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 3. 
33 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 4. 
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No longer will the different agencies only output products for their own use.  MDA 
requires agencies to make changes to their performance in prescribing what may be new 
priorities.  For instance, each numbered fleet inside the U.S. Navy has its own procedures 
and construct for how intelligence targets are selected and prioritized.  Each fleet may 
prioritize common targets differently as they move from fleet to fleet areas of 
responsibility.  The MDA requirement of better coordination across Federal, State, local 
and private agencies may require a change in performance for the numbered fleets.  As 
priorities are set in regards to obtaining information on vessels crossing AORs each 
numbered fleet may need to adopt and reflect the other numbered fleets priorities, 
changing how that fleet performs its information gathering.  No longer can the numbered 
fleets act autonomously in the manner they gather, process, and disseminate information, 
if they are truly adopting the MDA concept.  They will need to cooperate across AORs to 
provide and keep track of what is an interest globally. 
B. ASPECTS TO LARGE-SCALE CHANGE 
For organizations to make large-scale changes the changes must have a significant 
occurrence in three aspects: Depth, Pervasiveness, and Size.34.  Implementing large-scale 
changes in any organization is very challenging.  Understanding the affect a change has 
in each aspect will help determine how fundamental and large a change will be in an 
organization.  Not only can this be used to determine the affects of a change, it can also 
be use to help implement a change on a large-scale.  Large organizations have multiple 
subunits and subsystems, which make for a very complicated system of systems. 
Individual subunits may be very large and require large complex subsystems.  Affecting 
change in a few subunits, or subsystems and not across the organization is not large-scale 
change.  However, if a subunit, or subsystem enacts a change that force the larger 
organization and other systems to adopt the same change of the smaller unit or system, 
then the change is large-scale. The three aspects mentioned earlier are measures of 
change across the organization and the many subunits and subsystems that make it up.  
As the effect of each aspect is increased so too is the size of change.  If only two aspects 
                                                 
34 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 10-11. 
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of change are present and a third is missing or insignificant then large-scale change does 
not exist.  Each aspect must be present and to a significant degree for large-scale change 
to happen.  Figure 5 gives a graphical depiction of the three aspects and their affect on 
change. 
Per vasiveness in Change
Size of Orga nization 
Dep th of 
Change  
 
Figure 5.   Dimensions of Large-Scale Organizational Change35 
 
1. Depth 
Measuring the depth of change involves individual paradigms and understanding 
of the goals or mission of the organization.  Individual perception and understanding of 
the organizational goals help determine their subunit’s goals.  How the subunit or 
subsystem fit into the larger organization is key creating individual paradigms.  The 
paradigms created are models for how the individual views the subunit or subsystem 
function as a process of the larger organization.  The depth of change is not dependent on 
whether the individual agrees with the goal or structure, rather do they understand it and 
use it in their function.  A common understanding of the subunit or subsystem goals are 
made from the individual understanding to form a paradigm in which the subunit or 
                                                 
35 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 12. 
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subsystem exist and function.  Changes that have greater depth enact a larger shift in 
paradigm to include a rejection of the old mindset and adoption of the new one.  Shifting 
paradigms is not easy; it involves changing a person’s way of viewing and understanding 
the world.  Much resistance can always be found in the depth of change, because it is 
changing individual views of their purpose inside an organization and the purpose of the 
system to the organization. 
MDA as a complete paradigm shift will not occur very easily and is still ongoing.  
The U.S. Navy already considers itself a significant player in the maritime security 
system.  This view is no different from the position taken by the U.S. Navy in the 
Revolutionary War, Civil War, WW II and even now in a post 9/11 era.  The difference 
in how information is processed and shared marks the paradigm shift necessary for the 
U.S. Navy to fully adopt MDA.  Inside the U.S. Navy MDA may mean a shift in 
paradigm for the subunits and subsystems that contribute to the Navy mission of 
maritime security.  But measuring the depth of change MDA will have across the U.S. 
Navy and the numerous subunits and subsystems that make up the Navy is too big a task 
for one thesis.  Instead the technological change associated with MDA Spiral-1 
technologies and their affect on specific processes within specific subunits and 
subsystems will be addressed. 
2. Pervasiveness 
Measuring how many subunits and subsystems of an organization change will 
enable a measure of the pervasiveness of change.  If all the subunits and subsystems 
agree to adopt the same change, large-scale change will occur.  It is not enough for one 
subunit or subsystem in the organization to enact change and label this large-scale.  The 
more subunits and subsystems that adopt change, the more pervasive the change, hence 
the closer the change comes to being large-scale.  The pervasiveness of change has three 
limits: time, multiple change agents, and group cooperation through coordination.36  
Complex large-scale organizations need time to affect change across the whole system.  
                                                 
36 Allan M. Mohrman, Jr. et al., “The Phenomenon of Large-Scale Organizational Change,” in Large-
Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994), 16. 
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Expecting long established subunits or subsystems to shift a paradigm is unrealistic.  
Formulating and enacting a plan to take change to every subunit or subsystem requires 
time.  Change is an ongoing process to ensure it is received, adopted and implemented 
with the same intent the original change agent had in mind.  To initiate change in 
multiple systems, multiple change agents are needed.  Not one single person or 
technology is persuasive enough to affect change throughout the multiple subunits and 
subsystems that make up the larger organization and system.  Each subunit and 
subsystem needs to make the same technological change or have someone with the same 
vision and goals leading the direction of change.  For the change to be accessible to all 
subunits and subsystems, each of those subunits and subsystems must understand the 
change itself and then work together to build a consensus of what the change means.  
When all the subunits and subsystems work together to build a coordinated effort of 
change the change will take hold and be owned by the smaller units and systems, truly 
making the change pervasive.  A new paradigm will be created within and by the smaller 
units and systems. 
For the U.S. Navy, pervasiveness can be measured by how many numbered fleets, 
named fleets, task forces, etc adopt the changes mandated in the MDA concept.  For the 
units and systems acquiring Spiral-1 technologies the change will be easier.  Without 
placing the same technologies in every subunit and subsystem a large-scale change across 
the entire Navy will not be possible.  However, the numbered and named fleets will 
experience pervasive change because the placement of Spiral-1 technologies in the units 
and systems which support them.  The more wide spread introduction of the new 
technologies the more pervasive the technological change and the more large-scale the 
change.  How well the technologies are adapted, and used everyday will also determine 
how much influence they may have on being pervasive.  If the technologies are 
introduced with no training or not utilized the impact will be minimal.  Also, if the fleets 
do not coordinate how best to use these technologies and learn from each other again the 
affect may not be very pervasive.  Without coordination each fleet stands to use the 
technologies in the manner best fit to their needs.  Their own unique adoption of the 
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technologies will not aid in the large-scale change, the change will be limited to each 
fleet and how they choose to adopt the changes, which come with the technologies. 
3. Size 
Size is a subjective term, and it may seem easy to understand.  Large 
organizations are typically more complex requiring a large and complex change.  Simple 
changes will not be complex enough to enact a large-scale change across a large 
organization.  Large organizations contain certain aspects different and unique when 
compared to smaller organizations.  When determining the affect or size of a change on 
an organization understanding the size of the organization will help render a change 
appropriate to the size of the organization.  Determining the size of an organization 
requires a measurement of the organization in terms of it’s complexity, stage of 
development, age, strength of culture, degrees of strategic freedom, power to alter the 
environment, and how loose of a coupling the large organization has on the subunits, and 
subsystems.37  Resistance to change commonly comes from the size of an organization.  
The affects listed above can be dealt with and overcome individually but the overall 
character of the large organization is made from these. 
The U.S. Navy itself is very large and complex.  It takes many years for Officers 
to understand the system and many more to be knowledgeable enough to manipulate the 
system.  The different changes and manipulations to the system are made through the 
different perspectives each administration and top ranking officers utilize in their 
understanding of the role of the Navy and its responsibilities to maintaining maritime 
security.  Changes in the world order of power were affected by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  Many saw that as a catalyst to develop a different military.  Many would argue 
the development of the U.S. Navy to fit a post cold war era is still ongoing and therefore 
more susceptible to change.  But how much the U.S. Navy can change is still grounded in 
the law of responsibilities the Navy provides for the defense of the nation.  It cannot go 
off and rid itself of vital and key missions to maritime security.  As a large and powerful 
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Scale Organizational Change, (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass Inc., 1994),. 18-23. 
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organization the U.S. Navy has the potential to alter the maritime security environment, 
and how it operates inside of it.  By sponsoring research into new technologies and 
ignoring others the Navy can attempt to shape how maritime security systems will 
function.  The U.S. Being a super power with very few countries possessing the ability to 
outdistance the U.S. in leading research, the U.S. Navy gets an edge in deciding how the 
operating environment for Maritime Security will be shaped.  The last aspect of size, 
loose coupling, does not match very well with most organizations when compared to the 
U.S. Navy.  For the most part, fleets operate independently of each other, but there are 
specific protocols, which match across the fleets specific to the U.S. Navy and not the 
fleets themselves.  Each fleet will have its own set of standard operating procedures 
loosely based on larger Navy doctrine.  It would not be practical to send a unit from one 
fleet and operate in another fleet with a drastically different set of procedures.  So while 
each fleet may appear autonomous there are underlying procedures common to the fleets 
which keeps them closely connected to the large Navy system.  The challenge for 
implementing MDA in regards to size would be forcing the fleets to coordinate and 
cooperate with each other as well as the policy makers concerned with the development 
of MDA.  The CNO may not be concerned with the specifics of how each fleet will 
achieve MDA making it a loose coupling for the interpretation of the concept.  The 
technologies used are a concern, making the coupling very tight, and neglecting the 
uniqueness of each fleet. 
C. IMPLEMENTING CHANGE 
The type of changes (process, technological, organizational, etc.) and how 
fundamental those changes are for an organization will depend on many things to 
include; the mission or goal of that organization, how the organization and individuals 
view the organization, its operating environment, the technologies it chooses to adapt into 
its processes, its history, and the people doing the work.  Any one of these factors when 
changed will have an affect on the components of the basic system (input, process, 
output).  The process for recognizing a need for change is not easy and there are many 
techniques.  The change can come from within or outside the organization. Changes 
outside the organization that signal change include: the existing environment is changing, 
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resources the organization depends on will no longer be available or are changing, 
technologies used in the process are changing or will not be used by other systems it 
interacts.  Changes inside the organization include: new management with a different 
vision or way of processing inputs, a formal internal study can be performed to recognize 
inefficiencies in processes, new technologies may be introduced into the organization, 
new management may enter the organization with a different vision for the organization, 
new workers with different work skills or world views can be hired to deliberately change 
the organization’s process, or a change in policy may force the organization to change.  
Change will always consist of some catalyst adopted by or placed onto the system used 
by the organization, a manager to enact the change and monitor the change process for 
effectiveness, completion, and keep the change in line with the intended goal of the 
change process. 
1. Recognizing Change 
For an organization’s management to recognize the need for change the 
organization must have an objective understanding of the systems in use, how those 
systems add or take away from the goal of the organization or the “as-is” of the 
organization.  In addition to the “as-is”, the management must communicate a clear “to-
be” vision for the organization.  The “to-be” vision is a product of the management’s 
ability to recognize change in four key areas.  Noel M. Tichy describes the recognition 
process, “Problems, crises and/or opportunities emerge in the following areas: 1. 
Environment. 2. Diversification. 3. Technology. 4. People.”38  The environment in this 
model refers to the market or business the organization operates in, exclusive to how the 
organization may want the environment to change.  The environment can change because 
of a number of reasons; usually these changes are outside the control of the organization 
and require more of a reaction from the organization than a planned change.  
Diversification refers to the expansion of an organization as it develops and grows.  It can 
include an organization’s reach into other markets, inputs, outputs, and the need to 
change processes in adapting to the new area of interest.  Technology will continue to 
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develop and change and for organizations to survive they must understand the change and 
embrace it.  It seems to be a given that organizations will want the best technology has to 
offer at a price it can afford.  With that perspective Tichy describes technological change 
as doing the following, “it can lead to either incremental or strategic change.”39  And 
people, Tichy describes this change as happening in possibly two different ways, “people 
entering the organization may change in terms of education, expectations, or status, such 
as previous excluded minorities.  Or the people already in the organization may change as 
the result of education, or shifts in attitudes or expectations.”40  As workers come and go 
they bring and take with them their individual visions and goals for themselves and the 
company.  How they fit into the organization, and interpret the policies may change with 
their experiences in and out of the organization.  A manager needs to recognize 
opportunities for change that allow the organization to continue flourishing and be 
successful. 
2. Change Process 
As managers find opportunities for change and recognize the need for change, 
they must also have the ability to recognize the best ways to implement change.  Change 
for the sake of changing is not always the best method for keeping an organization poised 
to meet the challenges of a turbulent environment.  The common saying, “If it isn’t 
broken, don’t fix it” comes to mind.  However, organizations cannot become stagnant and 
allow opportunities to pass them by.  J. Duane Hoover gives an explanation to the 
individual understanding of implementing change.  He explains the importance of making 
sense of the change process, “successful organization change efforts based on accurate 
diagnosis of the elements that need to be addressed, especially during initial diagnostic 
phase of a change program.”41  As change is implemented the change agent responsible 
for overseeing the change process must have an accurate understanding of the change.  
The change agent will create a cognitive map of the change itself and how it affects the 
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organization.  The cognitive map of change for the individual is based on that 
individual’s perceived understanding of the organization.  A correct diagnostic 
interpretation of the organization, and change process is critical to the fulfillment of 
successfully implementing organizational change.  Hoover relies on an “innovation-
adoption process” developed by E.M. Rogers to model the actualization of implementing 
change.  The model is:  “1) Knowledge of the implementation. 2) Formation of an 
attitude, either favorable or unfavorable, toward the innovation. 3) Decision to adopt or 
not adopt the innovation. 4) Implementation, if adopted 5) Post implementation decision 
to retain or discard innovation.”42  Not only does the change agent need to have this 
actualization, the workers involved in the process of change must have this same 
actualization for the change to be successful.  Taking Roger’s model a step further, 
Hoover proposes actualization for change can also be measured across an individual’s 
intellectual, emotional, behavioral, and perceptual actualization.43  Hoover offers this 
model as another means to accurately interpret how best to implement change across an 
organization at the individual level. 
Looking at the change process from an organizational point of view a model for 
congruent change presented by the consulting firm of Mercer Delta is used.  This model 
like Tichy’s view demonstrates how change in an organization happens in more than one 
dimension.  For change to work it must fit and work with the structures of an 
organization.  Figure 6 is the Mercer Delta model that shows how different structures 
must be considered when addressing change in an organization. 
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Figure 6.   The Congruent Model44 
 
The model looks at change as a process with inputs (environment, resources, and history 
of the organization) which are affected by structures within the organization (work, 
people, informal organization, and formal organization) that process the inputs in 
accordance with the organization’s strategy leaving outputs (a new system, unit, or 
individuals). 
 Again to understand any system, a manager must be intimately familiar with the 
inputs into the system, the processes used and outputs of the system.  In the congruence 
model there is no change to what make up the elements for a change catalyst.  Ultimately, 
every system is affected by the environment; new rules, new policies, new technologies, 
new management, new resources are all changes outside the organization affecting the 
inputs into the system and creating the need for change.  When the need for change is 
identified and a manager puts the process of change into motion, the plan to implement 
change must address the fit of the change in regards to the structures of process change.  
In the congruence model four processes are identified: work, people, informal 
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organization, and formal organization.45  Work in this model refers to the actual 
processes of the system being changed and the people are the ones in the organization 
doing the work.  How the people go about doing their work through the informal 
relationships created is a reflection of the informal organization inside the system.  And 
the formal structures created by management to enable the people to do their work are 
example of the formal organization inside the system.  Together these components make 
up the organization element of the change process system.  While they are presented as 
separate components of the organization together they make up how the organization 
process inputs into outputs.  The key to congruence is understanding how a change in one 
element will affect change in the other elements.  By relating each element to the other, 
the change manager can create a plan that considers the best way to implement change 
across all the elements.  Understanding the change process can save the organization, and 
change manager valuable time and energy.  By applying congruence, an appropriate 
change that addresses change across all the elements of an organization can lead to a 
better fit within the organization.  A better fit will ultimately lead to true large-scale 
organizational change that affects the character and performance of an organization in a 
lasting and meaningful way. 
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IV. DATA 
The data used in this thesis comes from a study conducted by NPS to build a 
current or “as is” model of the U.S. Navy system in regards to how the movement of data 
and information enable the current MDA mission.  The Naval Postgraduate School was 
contracted by OPNAV N3/5 to aid in the process of implementing MDA as a concept and 
the technologies associated with it (Spiral-1) into the U.S. Navy.  The framework upon 
which the task was and continues to be worked is a system analysis approach using a 
business process redesign technique.  The data reflects a study in the socio-technical 
dimension and will be used to present the affects of placing technologies on top of 
existing processes in a large scale organization like the U.S. Navy. 
Portions of the data come from interviews with key stakeholders in the MDA 
process at varying levels. The interviews conducted were with personnel from 
CINCPACFLT (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet), MIFCPAC (Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center, Pacific), ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), and NAVCENT.  These 
specific commands were chosen for their direct involvement with current MDA practices 
and having been selected to receive Spiral-1 technologies.  From the interviews a 
qualitative analysis of concerns for implementing MDA along with Spiral-1 technologies 
was made.  In addition to interviews a Process Engineering Workshop (PEW) was 
conducted to provide inputs into a process analysis.  The PEW took place 15-17 January 
2008 at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Participants included representatives from, ASN 
RDA, C3F, COTF, Dept. of the Under Secretary of the Navy, DISA, HFE LLC, JITIC, 
METRON, MIFCLANT, MIFCPAC, NAVCENT, NAVNETWARCOM, NCIS, 
NORTHCOM, NPS, NRL, NWDC, ONI, OPNAV, PMW 120, and SPAWAR.  
Individual participants included; subject matter experts (SMEs) from the MDA Spiral 1 
technologies, representatives from the Trident Warrior 2008 (TW08) operational 
experiment where many of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies will be assessed, and members 
of the assessment team (NPS, Aptima, Pacific Sciences & Engineering, WBB Inc.).46 
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A. INTERVIEWS 
The interviews were with members of CINCPACFLEET, MIFCPAC, 
NMIC/ONI, and NAVCENT.  These organizations were chosen for their selection of 
receiving MDA Spiral-1 technologies.  They represent varying levels of systems and 
units in the U.S. Navy system and organization.  Each sub unit brings with it a sub system 
of processes for conducting current MDA.  Their views are unique and specific to their 
geographic area and level within the U.S. Navy system and organization.  The answers 
given represent the individual views of the personnel currently assigned to the commands 
at the time of the interviews and may not represent the current state of affairs.  Common 
threads throughout the interviews reflect a concern for personnel issues, specifically; 
manning requirements, training, and high rates of turnover.  Answers to questions 
regarding Spiral-1 technologies are given from the interviews conducted by the NPS 
study: 
1. CINCPACFLEET 
• The MOC to be stood up by 31 Jan 2008 will have a traditional 
organization. It will not include ONA; that function will be executed by N2. The 
intelligence staff is quite small (CPF N2 currently has 2 Information System specialists 
and one is an E-9), though there is an effort underway to extend the human resources by 
combining the CPF Intel Watch with the PACOM JIOC. Given the small size of its 
intelligence unit, CPF is concerned about the feasibility of learning, using, and 
maintaining new MDA technologies.  
• CPF does not need to maintain awareness of white shipping for its routine 
operations, though the capability is seen as potentially useful. However, CPF does need 
this capability to support one, highly complex OPLAN (intentionally unnamed, here). 
Thus, use of Spiral 1 technologies may be sporadic or localized to very few staff.47 
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2. MIFCPAC 
• MIFCPAC is responsible for all vessels approaching the US from 
continents except Europe. The organization provides considerable support to 
CINCPACFLEET, which has a small staff. However, MIFCPAC is focused on the Coast 
Guard mission, which concerns both terrorism and regulatory issues such as fisheries and 
pollution. Thus, its use of Spiral 1 tools may be unusual. For example, MIFCPAC may 
need alerts that discriminate reliably between loitering in fisheries by (1) American 
vessels and (2) potentially illegal foreign fishing vessels.  
• MIFCPAC sees value in selected MDA technologies. It is already using 
CMA to support analyses (such as the fisheries analysis, above), and it sees promise in 
Google and Global Trader. MIFCPAC argues that FASTC2AP may not be "viable" for its 
uses.48 
3. Naval Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC)/Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) 
• ONI continuously monitors 220-350 Vessels of Interest (VOIs). The watch 
floor – staffed by 13 people – handles as many as six formal RFIs daily about these and 
other vessels, 15-20 informal external requests daily, and a small number of ONI internal 
queries. The watch forwards approximately one formal RFI to analysis cells (or “day 
shop”, e.g., counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-proliferation, homeland 
defense) each day. ONI’s capability to handle this, current volume of tasking is hampered 
by difficulty sharing track data across the Navy, insufficient training resources, 
insufficient staffing for some activities (e.g., analysis of biometrics findings), and rapid 
turnover of staff on the watch floor. NMIC/ONI is recruiting several hundred additional 
staff. However, staff capacity is currently a concern. 
• Several Spiral 1 technologies are seen to have particularly high value 
within ONI or as data feeds to it: CMA, TRIPWIRE, TAANDEM, FASTCAP, and 
EMIO Wireless. However, ONI expressed concern that (a) the interoperability and 
integration of these and other tools (e.g., with GCCS) was not defined; (b) the process for 
                                                 
48 Jared Freeman and et al. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Workflow Model Status Report 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Draft March 2008), 8. 
 42
accrediting new tools for operational use is long (approximately and months) and 
somewhat uncertain; (c) the tools primarily increase the volume of data available for 
analysis but do not help analysts to manage those data; (d) the tools do not strongly 
enhance the capability to rapidly, reliably predict activity given cyclical and emergent 
events, or infer intent or culpability from scant entity-relationship data; and (e) the 
provision of tools (e.g., Google Apps for collaboration) is insufficient to provide the 
intended capability (e.g., improved collaboration) without new processes and training.49 
4. NAVCENT 
• MDA supports, but is subordinate to the primary missions of NAVCENT: 
maritime security, anti-terror, and Iran. The prospect of receiving Spiral 1 technologies 
sparked several concerns: the relevance of the technology effort to primary missions, the 
shortage of personnel and high rate of turnover (10% monthly), concerns about training 
staff to use technologies effectively for NAVCENT billets and processes, concerns about 
system reliability and maintenance, and the prospect that the flag might embark from 
NAVCENT. These concerns have led NAVCENT leadership to consider whether many 
MDA activities and Spiral 1 technologies should be housed at a JIOC or at ONI, provided 
that those institutions can reliably maintain awareness of NAVCENT’s mission focus. 
That said, NAVCENT leadership views positively the Spiral 2 initiative to combine the 
shore-based radars of many nations with AIS data. This capability would benefit 
operations in the MOC, and also strengthen partnerships in the region. 
• The knowledge of the Spiral 1 technologies among NAVCENT staff (at 
the time of the interviews) was scant, and so they had limited ability to assess the utility 
of these technologies. Watchfloor personnel see value in technologies that triggers or 
alerts concerning specific tracks. They state that they are unlikely to use technologies that 
require data mining or fusion across multiple sources.50 
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B. WORKSHOPS 
Two workshops provide data into this thesis, a Process Engineering Workshop 
(PEW) hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and a Process Analysis 
Workshop (PAW) hosted by the MHQ wMOC team for process architecture at Second 
Fleet in Norfolk, VA. 
1. Process Engineering Workshop (PEW) 
Participants in the PEW held at NPS on 15-17 January 2008 were representatives 
from ASN, RDA, C3F, COTF, Dept. of the Under Secretary of the Navy, DISA, HFE 
LLC, JITIC, METRON, MIFCLANT, MIFCPAC, NEVACENT, NAVNETWARCOM, 
NCIS, NORTHCOM, NPS, NRL, NWDC, ONI, OPNAV, PMW 120, and SPAWAR.  
Other participants included subject matter experts (SMEs) from several of the MDA 
Spiral 1 technologies, representatives from the Trident Warrior 2008 (TW08) operational 
experiment where many of the MDA Spiral 1 technologies will be assessed, and members 
of the assessment tem (NPS, Aptima, Pacific Sciences & Engineering, WBB Inc.).  The 
purpose of the PEW were the following: 
• Refine, extend, and validate a process model of Maritime Domain 
Awareness; 
• Define attributes of the activities that constitute MDA, specifically 
information requirements, processing activities, products, and resource (time, manning) 
requirements 
• Specify which MDA activities may benefit from Spiral 1 technologies 
• Develop concepts for assessing the effects of technology; and 
• Identify barriers to fielding MDA Spiral 1 technologies51 
From discussions on the potential benefit of Spiral-1 technologies to different sub units a 
Tasks to Technology Mapping occurred and is presented here: 
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40: ONI: Intel X X X Tbd X X  Tbd Tbd X  Tbd
55: ONA: Nominate potential VO X *X X X     * *   
60: ONA: Validate/(Re)Prioritize X  X *  *X  *X X *   
70: MOC Director: 
Receive/Decide/Route VOI 
        X    
80: COPS: Process VOI             
90: FOPS: Process VOI             
100: BWC: Assess Tactical Asset
Availability 
   *      *   
110: MOC Director: Define CDR
Estimate & COA 
X X  X  X  X X  X  
112: CNO/NOO: Approve COA X       X X    
115: MOC: Coordinate MOC-to-M
Handoff 
X       X X    
120: IWO: Issue RFI    *         
125: ONI issues RFI to MOC X X X X X X  X X  X X 
130: ONA: Process RFI (Issue, Fu
Assess Fulfilled) 
X *X X X *X *X  *X X * *X *X 
140: ONI: Process RFI (Issue, Fu
Assess Fulfilled) 
X X X X X X  X X X X X 
150: NCIS, CIFC, MARLO, MIF
NGA: Process RFI 
       X X X X  
160: BWC: Communicate Missio
Orders 
            
170: 6391: Fleet Asset: Plan & Di
VBSS Mission 
            
175: tbd#175: Fleet Asset: ISR Da
Collection 
            
180: Fleet Asset: Take 
Biometrics/Boarding Data 
      X      














































































205: ONI: Analyze biometric find     X X     X  
207: NGIC/ONI:Store biometric r             
210: ONI: Analyze Boarding Data X X X X X X     X  
220: Fleet Asset: Receive Boardin
Analysis 
      X      
230: ONA: Anaylyze Findings X *X X X *X *X  *X X * *X *X 
240: Coalition: Execute VBSS M             
250: COPS: Monitor VBSS             
260: COPS: Recommend Change
Mission/Revision of CAT Level 
            
270: COPS: Recommend Mission
Complete 
            
280: ONA: Monitor Vessel of Int
on Watch List 
X *X X X *X *X  *X X X *X *X 
Note: An “X” in this table indicates that the activity would benefit from the Spiral 1 technology in the 
opinion of PEW participants. A “*” indicates that the assessment by NAVCENT MOC is opposite a PEW 
assessment. 
Table 1.   The utility of Spiral 1 technologies for each MDA activity52 
 
The mapping occurred with the participants understanding of listed Spiral-1 
technologies capabilities and how those technologies would match up with MDA tasks.  
The participants assumed the workers doing the process at the different levels of the 
Navy organization would be familiar with and have access to all the proposed 
technologies.  It is also assumed the technologies presented perform within the standards 
discussed by the SMEs of the technologies.  Participants selected technologies that best 
fit processes already in place to perform the tasks listed. 
Also at the PEW was a discussion of workflow.  Workflow diagrams using the 
DODAF OV-6c format were presented.  The diagrams specifically addressed workflows 
on the NAVCENT MDA Process, the MDA Information from NMIC and how NMIC 
processed requests for information (RFI).  The participants made recommendations to the 
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activities, precedence, and clustering of activities.  An agreement was made that a formal 
Process Alignment Workshop would be more helpful in refining the processes presented. 
2. Process Alignment Workshop (PAW) 
The PAW was held in Norfolk, VA, hosted by the MHQ wMOC team for process 
architecture at Second Fleet, and participants included 20 warfighting functional area 
leads, system and process architects, process SMEs, and interoperability experts.  The 
PAW focused on the following objectives: 
• Review the MDA workflow and recommended limited revisions; 
• Map activities in the MDA workflow to MHQ wMOC processes or 
activities, and identify any issues in doing so.53 
Many recommendations to the MDA workflow were presented.  The data concerning 
these changes is not available; the revision of the DoDAF OV-6c is currently awaiting 
funding decisions. 
 The alignment to MDA processes produced the following results: 
• The MDA workflow represents a handoff between MOCs. There is no 
corresponding MHQ wMOC process or activity. 
• The MDA workflow specifies that COPs plans responses to VOIs. The 
MHQ wMOC processes specify that FOPs plans, and that COPs does not. 
• The role of the MOC Director in the MDA workflow may conflict with 
definitions in the MHQ wMOC architecture. 
• The role of the Foreign Disclosure Officer is not yet represented in the 
MDA or MHQ wMOC processes. 
• COCOMs each accomplish the MDA mission uniquely.  These MDA 
roles therefore need further development and refinement. 
• The role of the IWO in handling RFIs may need to be clarified in the 
MDA workflow. 
• Some MDA activities map to more than one MHQ wMOC process. This 
may reflect ambiguity in the MDA workflow. It may be an inherent challenge of mapping 
tactical MDA activities to operational processes of MHQ wMOC54 
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54 Ibid. 10. 
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The discrepancies found and presented in the PAW may be the result of aligning 
processes with an “as is” while the MHQ wMOC processes are the “to be”.  The refined 
workflow data presented in the NPS study will be used as a current look at the MDA 
processes.  How that process is affected by the matching of tasks to technology will be 
discussed next.  The “to be” is a product of implementing the tasks to technologies table 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data used present the concerns and issues that arise from viewing MDA as a 
concept change enabled through the adoption of specific technologies.  The interviews 
conducted speak to the challenges of mission change at varying levels.  From the 
interviews it was concluded a clear understanding of the different processes at the 
varying levels needed to be developed further.  The “as is” needed further mapping to 
understand the “to be”.  The Process Engineering Workshop (PEW) conducted 15-17 
January 2008 at NPS worked to build a coherent, current MDA workflow model.  The 
workshop not only refined workflow models developed by NAVNETWARCOM, 
participants also created a task to technology mapping table.  Both products have proven 
to be useful at the later process alignment workshop conducted at the MHQ wMOC team 
for process architecture at Second Fleet, in Norfolk, VA on 29 January 2008. 
Conclusions from the Process Alignment Workshop (PAW) point out gaps in the 
alignment of MDA tasks to Maritime Head Quarters with a Maritime Operating Center 
(MHQ Wmoc) core processes.  The current processes for MDA may not clearly align 
with the MHQ wMOC processes due to many reasons.  A full and dynamic list of 
procedures for MHQ wMOC has not been developed.  As the MHQ wMOC structure 
continues to be developed and implemented into fleet areas of operation specific 
processes will be developed to address concerns unique to those areas.  The more unique 
and further from the original core processes developed for the MHQ wMOC structure the 
harder it becomes to map a workflow model from which to address MDA 
implementation.  The uniqueness of each Combatant Commander (COCOM) is what 
enables them to make independent decisions aiding to the timeliness and efficiency found 
when operating in those regions.  However, the uniqueness of each command can add to 
the confusion of what formal processes to use when conducting a mission.  A standard set 
of MHQ wMOC procedures is needed to build a standard set of technologies, which can 
be easily implemented into the MHQ wMOC structure and MDA process.  Without a 
clear set of procedures and processes for achieving MDA, the technologies chosen and 
implemented will continue to fail in aligning them with current processes as seen in the 
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PAW.  While the standardization of processes and technologies is needed the processes 
and technologies must also be flexible enough to meet all the needs of each unique region 
and command.  Standardization will benefit the users of the formal structure within each 
system, making it easier for tactical units to transition from one AOR to another with a 
small amount of time spent on learning a new system. 
Clearly defining and standardizing watches and billets found inside the MHQ 
wMOC structure is also needed to aid in the development of MDA processes.  As noted 
earlier current MDA processes are unique to the various fleets and COCOMs.  The tasks 
to technologies table attempts to standardize the “to be” MDA concept by displaying 
which MDA processes will be affected by the implementation of Spiral-1 technologies.  
The method by which the table was created is problematic due to the small sampling of 
PEW participants when compared to the larger U.S. Navy organization, their own biases 
and limited knowledge of processes unique to the sub organizations they come from and 
have interacted.  An example of this is displayed in the table with discrepancies between 
the PEW participants and NAVCENT representatives.  The discrepancies represent 
differing opinions as to which Spiral-1 technologies will aid to specific tasks.  The 
difference of opinions is most likely due to a difference in how the tasks are processed.  
The PEW participants’ understanding of how best to complete a task with the 
technologies presented is their opinion unique to them.  The NAVCENT differences in 
regards to which technologies will best add to the completion of MDA tasks is also 
unique to them.  Again further highlighting the need to adopt standard MDA processes 
with standard technologies.  Another reason for the difference in opinion comes from 
unfamiliarity of the technologies presented in Spiral-1.  The misunderstanding of 
capabilities can be easily overcome with training, which must occur parallel to or before 
the implementation of said technologies.  The concerns for implementing new 
technologies in regards to training personnel, the maintenance of and its implementation 
are not new and can be studied further independent of this thesis. 
The data provided shows a strong inclination to enhancing intelligence processes 
already in place at various levels within the U.S. Navy organization.  An observation of 
which MDA activities will benefit from the Spiral-1 technologies table demonstrates this.  
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Most of the matches between technologies and tasks benefit activities associated with or 
labeled with the terms intelligence, information or analyze.  None of the technologies 
with the exception of E-Mio Wireless benefit the tactical operator, more specifically the 
units providing the data into the information process.  Referencing the Request for 
Further Information (RFI) processes (activities 125: ONI issues RFI to MOC, 130: ONA 
Process RFI (Issue, Fulfill, Asses Fulfilled), 140: ONI: Process RFI (Isssue, Fulfill, Asses 
Fulfilled)) displayed on the table, it is believed all but one activity (120: IWO: Issue RFI) 
will benefit from the Spiral-1 technologies.  This result displays the strengths of the 
Spiral-1 technologies.  They directly benefit information-gathering processes already in 
place by adding to the number of queried databases, and displaying the information in a 
format useful to the analyst.  It was determined fleet assets would not benefit from these 
technologies because they are currently not scheduled to receive them.  Even if fleet 
assets were scheduled to receive the technologies they would have difficulty utilizing 
their full capabilities due to physical limitations of bandwidth in regards to 
communication systems currently employed.  And it is not a function of the fleet unit to 
analyze the data collected in the analyst process of determining vessels of interests.  Fleet 
units can and often do produce their own RFIs when tasked with shadowing or boarding 
VOIs.  These RFIs are sent off ship for processing and are subject to a formal process 
within the system or AOR they are currently tasked.  A formal process is displayed in 
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This diagram describes the draft ONI process for handling RFIs as provided in notes form APTIMA
based on discussions between Jared Freeman and ONI representatives Jim Stallings, LT Lange and
Paul Carroll.  It was also reviewed by ONI rep LT King at the Process Engineering Workshop on 17
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Figure 7.   Process RFI55 
 
The process further demonstrates the fleet unit’s dependence on “outside the lifelines” 
processes in aiding their completion of mission.  From this example it is no wonder the 
choice of technologies to enable MDA focus on the intelligence and information 
processes vice the operational afloat unit. 
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(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Draft March 2008), 44. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In 2004 the President of the United States directed a change to the Maritime 
Security Policy; NSPD 41/HSPD 13, ”directs the coordination of United States 
Government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and 
cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local and private sector 
entities.”56  The directive requires, “the development of a National Strategy for Maritime 
Security” along with “a national plan to improve Maritime Domain Awareness”57.  The 
words “development” and “improve” were specifically chosen, mandating a change to the 
processes already in place to provide maritime security.  The National Strategy for 
Maritime Security presents the need for a more secure maritime environment.  The means 
by which the strategy suggests making this change is in eight separate plans, the National 
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness being one of those plans.  The Secretary of 
the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations recognizing the U.S. Navy’s role as a key 
shareholder in the National Plan to Achieve MDA developed a U.S. Navy MDA concept.  
The common thread to these documents is a recognized need to change the processes in 
place to share maritime domain information across the Navy and outside the Navy with 
coalition partner nations. 
MDA as a concept is a technique within the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security to address gaps in maritime security presented by the President of the United 
States.  The U.S. Navy MDA concept addresses the challenges to a secure environment 
from a Navy perspective.  The Navy concept makes some core assumptions about 
achieving MDA and they are: 
• Acquiring and sharing maritime information with a broad array of partners 
reduces vulnerability to attack and improves cooperation toward maritime security and 
safety. 
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• U.S. agencies and international partners perceive positive return on 
investment and recognize benefits of cooperating to achieve common maritime security 
goals. 
• Overcoming cultural and policy barriers to information sharing requires 
changes in business practices and information security procedures. 
• Planned Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center 
(MHQw/MOC) process and communication improvements will enable key aspects of this 
concept. 
• Costs to implement this concept will not be prohibitive.58 
These assumptions describe how the U.S. Navy views the problem of achieving MDA.  
The two key components of MDA are presented later in the Navy MDA concept as 
Situation Awareness and Threat Assessment.  Both of these components and assumptions 
about MDA rely heavily on information sharing and management.  It is also clear from 
the Navy concept that “changes in business practices and information security 
procedures”59 is a must. 
 To implement the President’s Security Policy the U.S. Navy has chosen to place 
new technologies on top of tasks already associated within the Navy mission to achieving 
MDA.  The changes implemented by the CNO to achieve MDA come from the PEO C4I 
office.  The technologies chosen come from programs already being tested and prototype 
technologies, collectively known as MDA Spiral-1.  The technological changes 
associated with implementing Spiral-1 focus on extending existing technologies abilities 
to access various data-bases in a timely and efficient manner.  The unique applications 
being developed as part of Spiral-1 attempt to enhance information gathering and present 
that information useable within the soon “to be” structure of MHQ wMOC.  Spiral-1 
technologies as presented earlier will have a limited affect on the intelligence systems in 
place.  Special regard was given to RFI processes demonstrating how the technological 
change associated with Spiral-1 is limited to the units receiving the technologies and 
systems that will benefit from their capabilities.  The conclusions made from this study 
provide insight as to how limited MDA implementation will be across the Navy system. 
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 From an earlier chapter in this thesis it was established, large scale organizational 
change happens when change occurs abundantly in three aspects; depth, pervasiveness, 
and size striking a change to an organizations character and performance.  By limiting the 
distribution of Spiral-1 technologies to a select few units, the level of pervasiveness and 
size is small.  Limiting the change procedure to the implementation of technologies that 
benefit a few processes within a specific system (the maritime intelligence system) the 
size and depth of change are also small occurrences.  However, large-scale change seems 
to be the intent of the CNO and PEO C4I office with the suggestion of continued spirals 
of technologies.  Large-scale change does not occur overnight, it takes time and the 
management of change at multiple levels across subsystems and subunits.  Just by 
naming the system of change Spiral-1 the suggestion is for follow on numbers of spirals, 
with the term spiral also suggesting a continuous path that wraps around itself leading to 
a center.  In the name chosen it would appear the intent is to make multiple changes 
across multiple systems and processes across the U.S. Navy.  However, by continuing 
research into technologies, which will enable faster, reliable, and more efficient 
information sharing the U.S. Navy will only enable current systems which rely on these 
processes and not change how they seek out and share information across the Navy and 
outside of it.  Changing the view of information managers inside the Navy to accept and 
freely share data across Navy systems and outside entities will enable lasting changes in 
the character and performance of the U.S. Navy necessary to implementing MDA. 
 A technique which has proven useful in changing business processes by making 
them more efficient is the Business Process Redesign (BPR).  A definition of BPR is:  
“the study, analysis, and redesign of fundamental business processes to reduce costs 
and/or improve value added to the business.”60  BPR is a way of viewing a process for its 
value in the whole system design.  Studying how inputs are processed will give a view, 
sometimes overlooked, of the system.  As processes are developed and new technologies 
introduced the technologies may not add to the value of the system, they just make the 
system more streamlined or even over burden the system with extra steps, “Many 
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processes are overly bureaucratic and do not truly contribute value to the business.”61  
Key to the BPR is a good analysis of the system from the beginning.  The tem often used 
is “value chain” to describe what processes actually bring to the system.  Identifying the 
processes inside a system can be a challenge unto itself, but then an assessment of how 
that process adds value to the system must be made.  A clear understanding of how 
processes work and the value for keeping them must be made.  It would seem the U.S. 
Navy skipped this part of the change or redesign process.  In the NPS study an attempt 
was made to do such an analysis of the current MDA system inside the U.S. Navy.  The 
study mapped out a workflow based on a boarding scenario from the NAVCENT 
perspective and procedures in place.  While this is a good start the same mapping needs 
to occur at every operational command.  Displaying the procedures for how each 
command processes information in regards to a specific scenario will create a starting 
point from which common threads can be identified; difference in procedures can easily 
be identified and brought back to a standard.  The process for gathering such information 
should involve interviews with the workers inside the system.  Interviews should not be 
restricted to the officers who manage programs but include the analyst and watch floor 
members.  These interviews should be structured to provide a set of answers which can 
be compared in a qualitative manner.  The interviews conducted by the NPS study did 
such thing, but on a scale which cannot compare systems across the U.S. Navy.  The 
comparison in the study is up and down a particular system.  Another study must be done 
across similar systems, i.e., a similar examination of the same processes from numbered 
fleet to numbered fleet and named fleet to named fleet.  By viewing the data process 
across similar systems, similarities can be found and discrepancies identified.  Changes 
can be made to bring the similar systems into alignment in regards to data processes and 
information management.  This change procedure should avoid the introduction of 
technology as noted in the BPR technique, 
Through process redesign, organizations seek to study the fundamental 
business processes to increase throughput and efficiency and to reduce 
waste and costs.  Process models, in various forms including data flow 
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diagrams, help organizations to visualize their processes and ultimately 
eliminate or reduce bureaucracy.  Thus, process models can return value to 
an organization even if the goal is not to design or purchase software to 
automate those processes!62 
This technique has clear benefits to introducing change into a system and across 
systems.  Conducting a clear study which identifies the value chain, how data is 
processed and flows through an organization is vital to making changes to the system.  
By just adding technologies on top of processes to enable a system, significant large scale 
change will not occur.  When an organization’s data processes and information flow is 
mapped managers can begin to identify unnecessary and inefficient processes.  The 
inefficient processes can be removed or changed to benefit the organization.  Only then 
can new technologies be introduced after the current or “as is” state is identified and 
understood.  Even then the “to be” or what will make the processes more efficient must 
be agreed upon within the organization. 
A clear mission or goal must be stated.  In the case of MDA, HSPD 13 makes the 
case for a new maritime policy.  The National Strategy created from the directed policy 
change lays the foundation for how Federal, State, local, and private entities will go about 
achieving a more secure maritime environment.  The National Plan to Achieve Maritime 
Domain Awareness takes it a step further by specifying actions to take for a significant 
contribution in the security of the Maritime Domain.  The U.S. Navy identifies with the 
plans goals and further states a mission commiserate with Navy capabilities.  For the 
Navy to implement the MDA mission correctly, a comprehensive study of how MDA is 
performed needs to occur along with training as to the differences of how MDA was 
performed and how the goal of how it will be performed.  Without a significant change in 
the outlook of what is MDA and how best to achieve it within the Navy and why it needs 
to change is not addressed change cannot occur.  Individual understanding of the 
mandated change from the President down to and through the CNO must occur.  The 
vision held by the individual must reflect the same understanding of the goal and mission 
as presented by the CNO.  As the individual understands their role further questions can 
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be raised as to how and what the individual may need to achieve the agreed new mission.  
When all submissions are gathered an analysis of the answers should occur with a panel 
of subject matter experts.  The SMEs will then look for the common threads and 
discrepancies in processes mentioned and highlighted earlier.  They will make 
recommendations on how to improve the process reflecting the requirements stated in the 
MDA mission.  As changes are implemented the managers of the systems must adhere to 
the changes and guide the change process to create the “to be” mission of MDA.   
Taking a BPR approach to implementing MDA will involve further research into 
the current state of MDA across the U.S. Navy.  Along with the study, a clear and agreed 
upon understanding of the MDA mission must be promoted.  The time needed to conduct 
such a study may not be afforded with the mandate for change handed down from the 
President.  Command understanding of what MDA is and how it is best achieved can 
happen at a rapid pace.  Managers at all levels must identify the processes that lend and 
take away value to the MDA process.  The managers must speak up and make note of 
which programs when introduced into current systems are not in alignment with the Plan 
to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. 
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